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EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT: HOW
MUCH CAN WOMEN EXPECT?
INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Equal Credit Opportunity Act' (ECOA) in
1974 to eliminate discrimination based upon sex or marital status in
credit transactions.2 Although the legislation addresses problems that
women face in obtaining credit, many discriminatory credit procedures
continue unabated. The ECOA's limitations include low-damage ceil-
ings, difficulties in proving actual damages, an election of remedies
clause that may preclude effective action in federal courts, and restric-
tive class action requirements. State property laws and family necessity
statutes also pose problems for divorced single women. Women often
are not aware of their rights under the new law or lack the financial
resources to obtain credit.
The ECOA amended the Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968.
In both the original and amended versions, Congress gave the Federal
Reserve Board of Governors3 power to prescribe regulations. This note
evaluates the impact of both the statute and the regulations on those
who utilize discriminatory credit procedures.
THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT
1. Background
Since its enactment in 1974, the Act has been subject to interpreta-
tion by the judiciary and the executive branch, both of which are re-
sponsible for enforcing it. The statute, as amended, specifically
prohibits discrimination by creditors with respect to sex, marital sta-
tus,4 race, religion, and national origin.5 Regulations promulgated pur-
suant to the Act have aided in its interpretation. In 1977 the Board
implemented the Act with Regulation B, which became effective in
March of 1978.6
2. The ECOA and Regulation B
Regulation B forbids discrimination by creditors on the basis of sex
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1976).
2. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1429, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 6148. The 1976 amendment to the ECOA included prohibitions against dis-
crimination on the basis of race, religion, or national origin in the credit area. The amended
act became effective March 23, 1977. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1976).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(b) (1976).
4. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d) (1980).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1976).
6. 12 C.F.R. § 202 (1980).
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or marital status and prohibits creditors from making any statement
that would discourage a person's application on account of sex or mari-
tal status.7 Other regulations prohibit a creditor's inquiry into an appli-
cant's birth control practices8 and marital status.9 They also prevent a
creditor from refusing a married woman an individual account in her
own name because of sex or marital status.'" The creditor cannot close
a woman's account or request a reapplication after a change in her
marital status, unless the husband's income supported the prior credit
and the woman's income no longer supports the credit extended.I If a
married woman needs a cosigner to support credit, the creditor may
request a cosigner but cannot suggest or require her spouse's signa-
ture.12 The law also requires creditors who furnish credit information
to determine which spouse maintains liability on a credit account and
to label the account accordingly. Thereafter, the creditor may provide
access or may furnish information to credit agencies in that spouse's
name only.13
Special Purpose Programs.1" In many instances, sex and marital
status information on an application will increase a woman's opportu-
nities to receive credit. The ECOA's special purpose program allows
creditors to request this information in certain circumstances without
violating the law.
Women generally have less income and lower-status jobs. Credi-
tor's studies, however, often establish women as better credit risks than
men.'- Professors Chandler' 6 and Ewert of Georgia State University
conclude that creditors and credit scoring systems should consider the
applicant's sex. In their study, conducted for the Credit Research
Center for Purdue University,' 7 they conclude that a system designed
to measure women as a group, apart from men, will provide greater
credit opportunities for women.' 8 In light of women's economic posi-
7. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(a) (1980).
8. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d)(4) (1980).
9. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5 (1980).
10. 12 C.F.R. § 202.7 (1980).
11. 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(c) (1980).
12. 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(5) (1980).
13. 12 C.F.R. § 202.10 (1980).
14. 12 C.F.R. § 202.8(a) (1980).
15. G. CHANDLER & D. EWERT, DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SEX UNDER THE EQUAL
CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT (1976) (Working Paper No. 8 of the Credit Research Center at
the Krannert Graduate School of Management-Purdue University) [hereinafter cited as
CHANDLER & EWERT].
16. In 1976 Professor Chandler was also President of Management Decision Systems, Inc.
17. CHANDLER & EWERT, supra note 15.
18. Id. at 8.
The basic problem stems from pooling the data for male and female applicants to
estimate regression coefficients (estimates of 'average' weights) when they possess dif-
ferent characteristic distributions or their characteristics relate differently to credit
performance. For example, if men typically handle financial matters, only one or two
bank references may be an indicator of risk, while for women, the establishment of
even one such relationship may be indicative of good credit performance. Such aver-
age weight systems tend to be male dominated because the majority of credit appli-
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tion in society, creditors should not compare a woman's credit indices
to those of a man. Women often have fewer creditworthy qualifica-
tions, such as banking contacts, references, and home ownership than
men.' 9 Yet, some women's qualifications, compared to equivalent
qualifications for men, may indicate that women are better credit risks
given the greater credit opportunities available to men.
Under ECOA regulations, creditors normally cannot identify wo-
men applicants. Credit applications must be reviewed on objective
data only. The ECOA's special purpose program provision allows
creditors to recognize sex discrimination's effects and use credit pro-
grams that identify applicants. Relaxation of normal restrictions al-
lows a creditor to acknowledge that identical information on a man
and a woman's application does not always reflect equal creditworthi-
ness. To penetrate these particular credit markets, the creditors' pro-
grams must follow regulation procedures and standards to identify
group members' applications and ask ordinarily prohibited questions.
Special purpose credit programs enable creditors to consider special
circumstances and their effect on credit qualifications. This program
benefits economically disadvantaged women.
cants are male. Pooling the data assumes that the relationships between risk
indicators and credit performance are identical for males and females . . . [yet] the
relationship between the predictors and credit performance may well not be the same.
19. Id. at 8 & 10.
TABLE 2
Sample Characteristics of Applicants
Percent of Percent of
Females with Males with
Characteristic Characteristics Characteristics
Low income .................... 58.8% 23.6%
Homeownership ................. 15.7% 24.3%
TABLE 3
Creditworthiness in Females
and Males with the Same Characteristics
Actual Characteristic: Low Income
Account
Status Percent of Females Percent of Males
Bad ............................ 40% 51%
Good .......................... 60% 49%
Characteristic: Home Ownership
Percent of Females Percent of males
Bad ............................ 11% .26%
Good ........................... 89% 74%
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3. Congress' Rationale for Enacting the ECOA
Testimony before the Committee on Banking and Urban Affairs2"
described thirteen situations" in which women encountered credit dis-
crimination. One frequently recurring practice was the use of higher
standards to determine women's creditworthiness than those used for
their male counterparts. To obtain credit women needed higher salary
levels, fewer obligations, and more stable employment than men.
Credit scoring systems22 applied different values for sex and marital
status, and creditors commonly inquired into a woman's birth control
practices. Many creditors presumed that a married woman was solely
dependent on her husband. Creditors often closed a woman's account
when she married or refused to include her income when a married
couple applied for credit. When a woman applied for credit, many
creditors inquired into her spouse's credit history and altered her credit
rating based on her spouse's rating. Creditworthy women were re-
quired to have their husbands cosign credit applications in situations in
which married men would not need a cosigner to obtain credit. Many
creditors would simply not issue separate accounts to married women.
20. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, S. REP. No. 93-278, 93rd
Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1973).
21. Id. at 17.
(i), Creditors held men and women to different standards in determining creditwor-
thiness-that is, salary level, obligations, employment, length of residence, and age.
(2) Creditors required newly married women to reapply for credit as a new appli-
cant; men needed only to give their signature to satisfy a truth in lending disclosure
statement.
(3) Creditors refused credit to financially sound married women who would have
received credit as single women.
(4) Creditors refused to include a wife's income when a married couple applied for
credit (credit cards or accounts, secured or unsecured loans, mortgage loans) or would
arbitrarily discount the wife's income.
(5) Divorced or widowed women could not establish credit in their own names
based upon a deceased or former spouse's credit accounts. Separated women had a
particularly difficult time since their accounts usually remained in their husband's
name.
(6) Creditors arbitrarily refused to consider alimony and child support as a source of
income.
(7) Creditor inquired into a young married woman's birth control practices to evalu-
ate credit applications.
(8) Creditors requested financial information on a spouse despite the applicant's
personal creditworthy background.
(9) Creditors often refused to issue separate accounts to married persons.
(10) Creditors considered employed spouses as dependents despite their earnings.
(11) Creditors often used credit scoring systems which applied different values for
sex and marital status.
(12) Creditors would alter an individual's credit rating based on the spouse's credit
rating.
(13) Employed women with good credit ratings would need to obtain their hus-
band's signature; banks would often refuse loans to single women without a cosigner
in situations in which male applicants would not need a cosigner.
22. Credit scoring systems are rapidly replacing the personal judgment system of evaluating
credit applicants among financial institutions. In a personal judgment system, a loan officer
makes decisions to determine an applicant's creditworthiness. The credit scoring systems
attach certain weights and numerical values to an applicant's characteristics. The applicant's
total points contrast that person to a control group of recent, previous borrowers who were
both creditworthy and uncreditworthy to determine the applicant's creditworthiness.
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Once divorced or widowed, women could not benefit from contribu-
tions made to their credit under a spouse's name. Conversely, they
could not separate themselves from a former spouse's poor credit rat-
ing. Creditors also refused to consider alimony or child support as a
source of income for women seeking to obtain credit. Credit problems
which existed for the married and formerly married women multiplied
for the female, single-parent family.
DISCUSSION
1. Societal Attitudes
Economic discrimination against women persists, despite statistics
which demonstrate that women are better credit risks, when the credit
systems judge the financial status of men and women with similar eco-
nomic criteria.23 Women, however, often do not have the economic
credentials needed to obtain credit; economic discrimination in the job
market exists as a major reason for women's low credit ratings. As
recognized by the Women's Bureau of the United States Department of
Labor and noted by the United States Supreme Court in Kahn v.
Shevin,24 since 1960 women have received approximately sixty percent
of the average income for men. In addition, women do not advance as
quickly as men in their jobs.25
The credit industry cannot assume full responsibility for women's
economic status and cannot grant credit to women with insufficient in-
come or excessive debt. Nevertheless, the Act should protect women
who have sufficient economic resources against credit discrimination.
Credit availability, along with equal employment opportunity,
23. CHANDLER & EWERT, supra note 15, at 8 & 10. The study concluded that men and women
had different credit characteristics. In a credit scoring system developed for a major bank,
Professors Chandler and Ewert surveyed a sample of one-half bad accounts and one-half
good accounts. Fifty-nine percent of the females and 24 percent of the males appeared as
low income persons. Sixteen percent of females and 24 percent of males own their own
homes. Low-income women receive less credit, yet only 40 percent of the females did not
pay as compared to 51 percent of low-income men. Among those who own their own home,
I percent of females did not pay while 26 percent of the males in a similar category did not
pay. Based on these and other statistics, the professors concluded that this study and others
establish women as better credit risks than men, even though women are more often denied
credit than men.
24. 416 U.S. 351 (1975).
25. The Coming Decade. American Women and Human Resources, Policies and Programs, 1979.
Hearings before the Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 273-363
(1975) (appendix to statement of Alexis Harman) [hereinafter cited as The Coming Decade].
.The earnings gap ratio between fulltime female and male workers fluctuates around .60. A
female concentration in the lower status occupations exists as the major reason for the persis-
tent male-female earning differential. In 1977, women comprised 32 percent of all year-
round fulltime workers. Females comprised 62 percent of workers earning 3,000-5,000 dol-
lars; 63 percent of workers earning 5,000-7,000 dollars. Yet, females comprised only 12 per-
cent of workers earning over 15,000 dollars. The labor study concluded that women received
less pay for doing the same job in certain instances and had difficulty achieving higher level
jobs and promotions. The earnings gap resulted from women's tendencies to seek job requir-
ing fewer skills, to work less overtime, and to remain in the work force for fewer years,
despite virtually the same length of education.
1981]
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equivalent salary levels, and societal attitudes, will play a vital role in
women's economic progress.
Secondary Effects of Discrimination. The common law established
woman's inferior position. It categorized the unemployed married wo-
man as her husband's dependent and imposed on the husband the duty
to support his wife. For many women, the common law and credit
discrimination confirm a belief in their inferior role. Economic dis-
crimination leads to lower self-esteem.26 Credit denial and other forms
of credit discrimination cause personal humiliation and frustration.
Congress, in the ECOA, recognizes women's frustrations and ac-
knowledges that these feelings occur partially from credit denials that
place women at a substantial economic disadvantage. Lack of credit
narrows choices for women in such basic matters as housing and occu-
pation. Avenues open to men close abruptly for women. Congress re-
alized the importance of credit availability and found that credit today
does not exist as a luxury for the rich, but a necessity for all.27
2. Enforcement
A. In General. The Attorney General and numerous administra-
tive agencies provide administrative enforcement within a two-year
statute of limitations.28 A similar statute of limitations exists for the
private plaintiff who may bring an action in a federal district court.29
The law also allows the award of court costs and attorneys' fees to the
successful plaintiff.3° In Vander Missen v. Kellogg-Citizens National
Bank of Green Bay,3 the court afforded the plaintiff a right to a jury
trial under the ECOA. A plaintiff may sue for actual and punitive
damages under 10,000 dollars in any individual action. In a class ac-
tion, plaintiffs can recover one percent of a creditor's net worth up to a
500,000 dollar limit.32 The Senate intended that these substantial pen-
alties deter large companies without having ruinous effects upon small
companies.33
B. Enforcement Weakness: The Class Action Suit. The statute's
damage ceiling and judicially imposed notice requirements discourage
potential plaintiffs and dilute the effect of sanctions against large corpo-
26. Judith Younger, in her article Not Equal Yet, 13 IDAHO L. REV. 227 (1977), addresses dis-
crimination's impact upon a woman's life and describes the frustration with a quote from S.
Ashton-Warner: "I don't mean to go down under marriage and babies .... down at heel,
straggly hair and nothing important to say. I'm not one of those people who was born for
nothing."
27. S. REP. No. 94-589, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 403-405.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(c) (1976).
29. Id.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(c) (1976); 12 C.F.R. § 202.1(c)(3) (1980).
31. No. 78-C-671 (E.D. Wisc., filed Aug. 10, 1979).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(b) (1976).
33. S. REP. No. 94-589, supra note 27, at 415.
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rations. The legislatively imposed ceiling on penalties takes away from
the jury the power to determine relative penalties in each case.
In addition, inflation erodes the 500,000 dollar limit, and a low-
damage ceiling provides insufficient incentive for large class action
suits. The ceiling also fails to provide a sufficient deterrent for large
corporations. Should the jury impose the maximum penalties upon
two corporations of different sizes for similar violations, the ceiling re-
sults in unequal punishment.
Congress should abolish the damage ceiling. With a damage ceil-
ing, the class action's effectiveness as a remedy diminishes under bur-
densome and costly notice requirements34 imposed by recent United
States Supreme Court cases.35 The plaintiffs best possibility for relief
is an individual lawsuit.
C. Enforcement Weaknesses.- The Individual Plaintf. Plaintiffs
are likely to have difficulty proving actual damages from an unlawful
credit denial. Recovery will often depend upon punitive damages, a
fact which further limits the ECOA's effectiveness. Recently, however,
the District Court for the Northern District of California in Schuman v.
Standard Oil Co. of California36 suggested an expanded definition of
actual damages to include harm to one's credit reputation. The court
mentioned in dicta that the ECOA provided for actual and punitive
damages, including compensation for "embarrassment, humiliation,
and mental distress."37 In each instance, the plaintiff must prove these
damages.
The Schuman court would grant punitive damages to "the extent to
which the creditor's failure of compliance was intentional,"38 but in or-
der for the court to find liability, plaintiffs need not prove that the cred-
itor's actions are "wanton, malicious, or oppressive . . . ."" The
threshold requirement for damages exists if the defendant has acted in
reckless disregard to deny women the same credit opportunities as
men.4" Neither the courts nor Congress have subjected the creditor to a
strict liability standard. The ECOA does not impose liability for acts
done in good faith, which were intended to conform to a Federal Re-
serve Board rule, regulation, or interpretation."
Schuman expands the concept of actual damages and lowers the
threshold to prove punitive damages, thus lessening the plaintiff's bur-
den of proof and making it less difficult for the plaintiff to obtain a
monetary judgment.
34. E.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
35. S. REP. No. 94-589, supra note 27, at 416.
36. 453 F. Supp. 1150 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
37. Id. at 1154.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1159.
40. Id. at 1156.
41. 12 C.F.R. § 202.1(c)(2) (1980).
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3. Judicial Interpretation of the Act
A. Effects Test Analysis. Regulation B allows the creditor to use
any information he obtains, as long as the data does not violate specific
provisions against discrimination. Regulation B prohibits credit prac-
tices that allow subtle discrimination in which either the applicant's sex
or marital status has a negative effect on a credit application. The leg-
islative history of the ECOA indicates that Congress intended the judi-
ciary to employ an effects test analysis, similar to that in civil rights
legislation, to ferret out superficially obscure discrimination.4 2
The effects test is an enormous aid to women in credit litigation.
Analysis under the test requires a woman to establish a prima facie case
of discrimination: that a creditor's practices or inquiries produce sexu-
ally disparate credit results. The burden then shifts to the creditor to
show that this policy or inquiry relates to valid credit requirements.43
If the creditor establishes a valid relationship between the controverted
credit practice and permissible credit criteria, the burden of proof prob-
ably' shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the creditor could have
used a less restrictive alternative, free from the alleged discrimina-
tion.45
Congress moved boldly in offering the effects test analysis as an ad-
dition to the Act. The effects test will do much to protect women from
covert credit discrimination.
42. S. REP. No. 94-589, supra note 27, mentions two United States Supreme Court cases used to
interpret the civil rights legislation, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), which set out the effects test analysis
and the burden of proof between the complainant and the defendant. The report stated that
"in determining the existence of discrimination ... courts or agencies are free to look at the
effects of a creditor's practices as well as the motives or conduct in individual transactions.
Thus, judicial constructions of anti-discrimination legislation in the employment field, in
such cases as Griggs and Albemarle, are intended to serve as guides in the application of this
Act, especially with respect to the allocations of proof." The Court in Albemarle cites Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), to establish the respective parties'
burden of proof.
43. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Once the plaintiff established that the con-
troverted practice caused disqualification for more Negroes than whites the burden shifted to
the employer to show that the requirement had a "manifest relationship to the practice in
question." Id. at 432.
44. Regulations have not made clear which party must prove that the creditor could have used a
less discriminatory practice or inquiry and this question has not yet appeared before the
courts. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). After plaintiff has made a
primafacie case against the employer by showing that the controverted test or qualifications
select applicants in a racial pattern which is significantly different from the whole pool of
applicants, the burden shifts to the employer to show a manifest relation between the test or
qualification and the employment in question. If the employer meets this burden of proof,
plaintiff may show that other tests or selection devices exist without an undesirable racial
effect to serve the employer's interest and thus show the employer's tests as mere pretexts for
discrimination. Id. at 425.
This added burden of proof principle in Albemarle was unnecessary to decide the case as
the employer's tests did not pass the job relatedness test. The Court cites the holding in
McDonnell v. Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 802.
45. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(p) (1980). Regulation B requires that the system be periodically revali-
dated as to its predictive ability by use of appropriate statistical principles and adjusted as
necessary to maintain its predictive ability.
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B. Credit Scoring Systems. The ECOA requires a creditor to re-
spond to an application within thirty days of its receipt. Upon denying
credit, the creditor either must provide the applicant with the specific
reasons for denial in writing (orally, in specified situations) or must
inform the applicant that she remains entitled to a list of specific rea-
sons within ninety days.46
The required specificity creates problems for creditors who use a
standardized, objective credit scoring system that grades different crite-
ria, for example, occupation, income, home ownership and compare
scores to past creditworthy and uncreditworthy customers. Under Reg-
ulation B, a creditor is required to identify the specific reasons for
credit denial, even though no one identifiable reason exists.47 The reg-
ulation prohibits statements which indicate that an applicant failed to
achieve a sufficient score.4" The creditor must identify reasons for the
credit denial when, perhaps, no one reason exists.
C Creditor Scoring Systems and the Effects Test Analysis. Credit
scoring systems may prove particularly susceptible to the effects test
evaluation, a susceptibility that may foster lawsuits based upon dis-
crimination against a protected class. The credit scoring systems attach
certain weights and values to the applicant's characteristics. The appli-
cant's total points allow a creditor to compare that applicant to a con-
trol group of recent borrowers who were both creditworthy and
uncreditworthy, to determine the applicant's creditworthiness.49 Under
the effects test analysis,5" the creditor must examine his credit scoring
system to ensure that a less prejudicial alternative does not exist.
Whether a single question in a credit scoring system may fail the effects
test and render the system discriminatory and invalid under the ECOA
remains unanswered by legislative history and the courts. Conceivably,
the courts could extend the effects test to its outer limit and find overt
discrimination in a question that places a weighted value upon income-
debt ratio, a factor that always influences creditworthiness. Given wo-
46. 12 C.F.R. § 202.9 (1980).
47. Creditors who use credit scoring systems encounter a problem when the applicant's score
falls below the creditor's acceptable level; the applicant's score does not suggest any specific
reason with which the creditor may refuse the applicant credit.
48. S. REP. No. 94-589, supra note 27, at 409; 12 C.F.R. § 202.9(b)(2) (1980). The bill's support-
ers contended that the required specific reasons for credit denial would provide a "beneficial
educational effect" to the applicant and guide the uncreditworthy towards successful credit
applications while they encouraged the creditor to make decisions upon proper, nondiscrimi-
natory grounds.
49. At a creditor symposium on the new ECOA, Mr. Robert F. Getzer, a New York attorney, in
charge of Consumer Credit Legislation and Regulatory Activities, informed the business
community to its potential liabilities regarding credit scoring systems and the need to relate
each weighted value to valid credit criteria. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 33 Bus. LAW.
1073, 1078 (1978).
50. Id. at 1082; see discussion in text at 4. Effects Test Ana ysis, supra. Mr. Geltzer makes the
argument that the effects test should apply against the total credit scoring system. Plaintiffs,
on the other hand, will argue that a creditor's ECOA violation occurs with a single discrimi-
natory question within a credit system.
19811
Journal of Legislation
men's economic status in society, this question produces disparate
credit results between men and women.
Such an interpretation by the courts appears unlikely. Although the
use of income-debt ratios in credit scoring systems overtly discrimi-
nates against women, the courts should hesitate to rule that this crite-
rion is inherently discriminatory. Such a ruling would place the entire
burden for credit equality upon the credit industry and ignore other
causes for women's low economic position and their credit problems.
In Schuman,"' the plaintiff argued that the credit scoring system
was inherently discriminatory against women in light of their low eco-
nomic status. Mrs. Schuman alleged the credit scoring computer sys-
tem discriminated on the basis of sex because it assigned values to
characteristics such as employment and income, which had significant
association to sex. The court noted the lack of case law and legislative
interpretation but did not address plaintiff's argument. As a result,
creditors and applicants do not know how the court will apply the ef-
fects test to credit scoring systems that reflect societal discrimination
against women.
4. The ECOA's Exemptions
A. State Property Laws. Two major exemptions in the ECOA
leave discriminatory property laws intact and permit creditors to re-
quire the spouse's signature to create a valid lien, pass title, waive in-
choate rights (dower and courtesy), and assign earnings.52 As a result,
the Act does not benefit women who have limited power to commit
their own resources under state law.
In most states, a state property law exemption in the ECOA leaves a
majority of women53 powerless to obtain credit in their own names: In
forty-three separate property jurisdictions,54 property laws vest owner-
ship in the income-producing spouse. In those jurisdictions, fifty-four
percent 55 of all women remain unemployed and have no power to bind
their husbands' income to obtain credit without their husbands' ap-
proval. In separate property jurisdictions, many employed, married
women earn less income than men. This is due, in part, to societal
discrimination that results in low pay, less advancement, and career
interruptions due to child-rearing.5 As a result, many employed mar-
51. 453 F. Supp. 1150 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 1691d (1976).
53. In addition to 54.7 percent of married women who are unemployed, many women work at
various stages of less-than-fulltime employment. Many women are underemployed and thus
uncreditworthy.
54. Bingaman, The Impact of the Equal Rights Amendment on Married Women's Individual
Rights, 3 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 26, 27 (1975).
55. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, SPECIAL LABOR FORCE RE-
PORT: MARITAL AND FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS OF WORKERS, 1970 TO 1978 at 219 (1979).
In March of 1978, 47.6 percent of all married women were seeking employment compared to
40.8 percent in March of 1970.
56. See note 10 supra.
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ried women can not achieve a creditworthy income level. Community
property states give each spouse one-half ownership in property accu-
mulated during the marriage.57 Individual community property states,
however, may vest control in three ways: in the husband, in either
spouse, or in both spouses jointly (joint management). In joint man-
agement, community property states, the.wife may commit community
assets, whether or not she is employed. Her credit status is contingent
upon the couple's joint creditworthiness.
In Louisiana, Nevada, and Texas, state law gives husbands exclu-
sive control over community property and requires married women
who apply for credit to obtain their husbands' consent. Because many
unemployed and underemployed women do not receive any economic
recognition for household and child care work, they cannot achieve
substantial economic independence and independent credit. Only
those women, who are fully employed outside the home and whose in-
come warrants credit, receive protection under the ECOA.
The second major exemption allows the creditor to require a
spouse's signature. This provision also permits the creditor to request
information on an applicant's spouse, if the applicant relies on the
spouse's income for repayment, if the spouse remains contractually lia-
ble for the credit, or if the couple lives in a community property state in
which creditors must rely on jointly held community property.58 Al-
though the legislators indicated that "this shall not constitute discrimi-
nation,"59 the exemption allows creditors to require the spouse's
signature to obtain clear title to security under applicable state law. As
mentioned previously, state property law vests either exclusive owner-
ship in the income-producing spouse or common ownership in both
spouses in community property states. Women, therefore, must depend
upon their husbands and their signatures (if they choose to give them)
to obtain their own credit.
Both exemptions leave intact discriminatory state laws that reflect
outmoded notions of a woman's role. The ECOA's goal of equal credit
treatment will not guarantee equal credit results, if the law permits the
discriminatory state property law exemptions to exist. Equal credit will
only result from equal credit opportunity and from recognition of a
spouse's work in the home, as in the joint management, community
property states.
57. 1 R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 464 (1977). Eight states, Arizona, Idaho, Louisi-
ana, New Mexico, Texas. Washington, Nevada, and California, have community property
laws. Both spouses may own separate property, in addition to acquisitions during the mar-
riage that constitute community property. Separate property includes those assets acquired
before the marriage or gifts given to the spouse during the marriage. Five states grant joint
management or control to either spouse. In two states, Louisiana and Nevada, husbands
alone retain power to convey community property, and in Texas the wife can gain control
over her earnings if she becomes employed.
58. 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(3) (1980).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 169ld(a) (1976).
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B. Divorced Women. Credit applications must contain a notice
that a divorced woman need not disclose alimony or support, if she
does not want that income to contribute towards her creditworthiness.6 °
Nondisclosure allows the divorced applicant to avoid any stigma due to
her marital status and any negative effect upon her credit rating that
results from a previous spouse. However, one may reasonably con-
clude that the few women who receive support payments rely heavily
upon that income to obtain credit.6 ' These divorced women should be
allowed to report support and alimony income without identifying the
source of this income.
This dilemma cannot be solved solely through the ECOA. Studies
show that the courts award alimony in less than ten percent of divorce
cases. Unenforced support and alimony orders may leave the majority
of those women empty-handed. 62 One cannot expect creditors to ex-
tend credit based on support or alimony income with such an enforce-
ment record in the courts. Fault does not lie solely with the credit
industry but stems from a combination of problems in the legal system,
its enforcement procedures, and women's low economic status.
A woman may elect to include alimony and support payments on
an application for credit, but Regulation B provides that a creditor
need only consider these payments "to the extent they are likely to be
made."' 63 To determine whether a former spouse will pay consistently,
the creditor may consider a couple's written agreement or the court
decree, the time period within which the divorced woman received pay-
ments, payment regularity, procedures available to compel paymments,
and the spouse's credit history to the extent allowed under the Fair
Credit Reporting Act.' This regulation results in credit denials to di-
60. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(d)(2) (1980).
61. Nagel & Weitzman, Women as Litigants, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 171, 189-191 (1971). As men-
tioned previously, most women remain unemployed during marriage (54.7 percent). As for-
mer homemakers, mothers, or underemployed workers, these women often lack the
marketable skills necessary for economic security after their marriages have ended. Most
often, divorced and separated mothers also face child care problems and related costs that
require additional dependence on support or alimony payments.
62. Id. at 189-91. Within one year after divorce decrees, only 35 percent of fathers were in full
compliance with the support orders, 20 percent partially complied, and 42 percent made no
payment at all. By the tenth year, 13 percent were in full compliance. Seventy-nine percent
made no attempt to comply with the court orders. The Coming Decade, supra note 25, at
1343, 1360-75.
The number of divorced people increased during the period, 1960-1977, from 35 per
1,000 married persons to 84 per 1,000 married persons in 1977. Households maintained by
women without a husband present increased from 8.7 percent in 1970 to 10.6 percent in 1978.
More than 30 percent of these households fell below the poverty line, while only 5.5 percent
of male-headed households were in the same situation. These single mothers in the labor
force bear the burdens of both working and assuming full responsibility for housework and
child care. Id. at 273-363 (appendix to statement of Alexis Harman).
Families headed by women, especially if headed by black women, are more likely to live
in poverty than families with both spouses present. Also, families headed by women earned
on the average 10,000 dollars less than families with both spouses present. The incomes of
black women were lowest among all groups.
63. 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(5) (1980).
64. Id.
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vorced women based on the former spouse's credit history, even if the
former spouse continues regular alimony or support payments. This
result contravenes the ECOA's stated goals, as a woman who is a di-
vorced homemaker or mother suffers credit discrimination on account
of her marital status or her former husband's credit history. The pres-
ent support and alimony record, however, causes creditors' legitimate
concern when they grant credit based upon income from these
sources.65 The ECOA cannot solve this problem without cooperation
from the courts in the enforcement of support decrees and without
changes in existing property law with respect to marital relationships.
C. Necessities Statutes. Another state law exemption 66 diminishes
the ECOA's strength and contributes to hardships for the low-income,
female-headed household. State family expense or necessities statutes
diminish the divorced or separated woman's credit. The state statutes
allow either spouse to purchase family necessities and imposes full,
joint liability that continues past the marriage.67 Often, however, the
husband was the sole income producer in the marriage and the cause of
delinquent payments. Yet, these debts burden divorced or separated
women, including an increasing number of women who oversee a low-
income family,68 frequently without support from the former spouse,
and suffer from the state law exemption.
The family statutes include hospital care and public utility costs.
Creditors who deal in these necessaries can deny a separated or di-
vorced woman an account, if a previous account, under a former
spouse's name, has an outstanding balance. The separated or divorced
woman cannot rebut the negative inference on her credit and cannot
submit evidence that shows she had no involvement in the delinquent
payments or outstanding account. Plaintiff's lawyers may argue that
the family expense statutes are ultra vires and a due process violation.
Nevertheless, until these arguments gain acceptance, the statutory ex-
65. Nagel & Weitzman, supra note 61, at 189-91. Despite sanctions like contempt of court, civil
action, criminal prosecutions, and the state's incentive to avoid unnecessary welfare pay-
ments, the state rarely initiates legal action. Only 19 percent of noncompliant fathers at the
end of the first year were subjected to legal action and only 1 percent at the end of the tenth
year. The authors discuss causes and remedies of the phenomenon.
66. 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(c) (1980).
67. Baker & Taubman, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act. The Effect of the Regulation on the
Poor, 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 543, 545-46 (1975).
68. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, Ser. 60 No. 119 CHARAC-
TERISTICS OF THE POPULATION BELOW THE POVERTY LEVEL: 1977 (1979). One of the most
significant changes in the poverty population between 1969 and 1977 was the increase in the
number of poor families headed by a female with no husband present (1.8 million to 2.6
million). This rise, combined with the decline in the number of families with a male house-
holder, resulted in an increase in the percentage of poor families with a female householder
from 36 percent in 1969 to 49 percent in 1977. Thirty-two percent of families with a female
householder fell below the poverty level, while that rate remained at 6 percent for all other
families. This number jumped to 71 percent for poor, female-headed, black families, up
from 54 percent in 1969. Id. at 3.
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emption will impose liability for outstanding accounts on a spouse who
had no income or financial influence during a marriage.
One provision may benefit the divorced or separated applicant.
Regulation B requires a creditor to consider accounts for which the
applicant's spouse or former spouse shares liability in order to establish
the applicant's creditworthiness. The creditor, however, must also dis-
count those accounts under the applicant's name that do not accurately
reflect that person's creditworthiness.69 The applicant must produce
evidence to show the creditor that she either maintained good standing
on a credit account in someone else's name, or was not responsible for
a delinquent account. This provision increases the divorced woman's
chances to obtain credit by giving the creditor the opportunity to ana-
lyze the individual applicant apart from her spouse's credit standing.
5. Preemption and Election of Remedies
The ECOA preempts inconsistent state law that contravenes the
federal act. Regulation B, however, permits similar state legislation
that provides equal or greater protection to the applicant to continue to
exist.
Despite the preemption provision, state equal credit laws often fail
to have either the force or scope of the ECOA. State human rights
commissions enforce the state's credit laws, and these administrative
agencies rarely enforce the law through lawsuits or interpretative regu-
lations. As a result, few private lawsuits arise. Administrative agencies
or plaintiffs lawyers frequently handle violations privately without
lawsuits which are essential to encourage future plaintiffs, to provide
useful precedent, and to deter creditors. Few states provide court costs
for the plaintiff. State laws frequently place a low ceiling on punitive
damages. They fail to provide either incentive for plaintiffs or deter-
rence for creditors.7°
The election of remedies clause could penalize less sophisticated
plaintiffs who choose the least burdensome state procedure and receive
little or no remedy under a state provision. Once the plaintiff has
brought suit against a creditor in the state court, the election clause bars
any future action under the ECOA in federal court. It leaves the plain-
tiff with little or no remedy. State violations, therefore, constitute a
federal ECOA violation, 7' and a plaintiff can bring an action under
69. 12 C.F.R. § 202.6(b)(6)(iii) (1980).
70. The description, analysis, and classification involved in state credit discrimination laws are
beyond the scope of this note. For a discussion and analysis of problems involving state
credit laws, see Polikott, Legislative Solutions to Sex Discrimination in Credit n Appraisal, 2
WOMAN'S L. REP. 26 (1955). For in-depth analysis of each state's credit discrimination stat-
ute and its particular loopholes, see Credit Discrimination: Hearings Before the Subcomm on
Consumer Affairs of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 633,
638-53 (1975); Gates, Credit Discrimination Against Women: Causes and Solutions, 27 VAND.
L. REV. 409 (1974).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1691d(e), (g) (1976).
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either the ECOA or state law. An election-of-remedies clause, how-
ever, precludes a plaintiff from an action in court based upon a previ-
ous suit in either a state or federal court.72
6. The Legislative and Judicial Response
A. History. The 1960-70 Civil Rights legislation had a major im-
pact on women's rights and helped to create laws that, in theory, guar-
anteed equal rights, equal pay, and an increase in women's chances for
equal credit. The Equal Pay Act of 1963,73 Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964," the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972," 5 and
subsequent judicial decisions established the principle that women
should receive equal treatment on the job with regard to pay and fringe
benefits.
The Equal Pay Act of 1963 prohibited discrimination on the basis
of sex and required equal pay for work on jobs that required equal
skill, effort, and responsibility. 76 Subsequently, the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Amendment of 1974"7 extended this principle to additional occu-
pations. The Equal Pay Act, however, exempts differences in salaries
due to a seniority or merit system.78
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. of 1964 prohibits sex discrimina-
tion in hiring, firing, salaries, or other conditions of employment based
on a worker's sex. 7 9 The Equal Employment Act of 1972 extended Ti-
tle VII and the 1964 Civil Rights Act to businesses with fifteen or more
employees8" and empowered the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission to file suit against employers in non-compliance after in-
formal attempts to remedy the problem.8' Federal employees could
bring suit for discrimination by the federal government.
8 2
• Subsequent United States Supreme Court decisions strengthened
equal employment opportunities for women. In Phillis v. Martin Mari-
etta Corp. ,83 the Court held that a company that refused to hire a wo-
man with school age children and did not apply the same standard to
male applicants failed to comply with the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Company rules that differentiated between the sexes had to be based
upon a bona fide occupational qualification, reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of the business. In Weinberger v. Wisenfeld84 and
72. 15 U.S.C. § 1691d(e) (1976).
73. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1976).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976).
75. Id.
76. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(I) (1976).
77. 29 U.S.C. §§ 202-208 (1976).
78. See note 76 supra.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(I) (1976).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(e)(B) (1976).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(F) (1976).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1976).
83. 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971).
84. 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1975).
19811
Journal of Legislation
Calfano v. Goldfarb ,85 the Court held that both men and women would
have to prove economic dependency on the other spouse in the same
way and struck down all contrary assumptions. In Los Angeles Depart-
ment of Power and Water v. Manhart,6 the majority stated that Title
VII and the Civil Rights Act focused on fairness to individuals rather
than classes. The Court disallowed treatment of an individual as a
member of a sexual class. Employers, therefore, can not apply sexual
generalizations to an individual.
The Supreme Court, however, has not yet fully recognized the value
of a spouse's homemaker and child care services. Hisquierdo v. His-
quierdo 87 ruled that a wife in a community property state did not have
any rights in her husband's Railroad Retirement pension and that
therefore she would not receive one-half in a property division.
B. Social Security. Apart from judicially imposed changes in the
Social Security System, the law still makes significant differentiations
between the sexes. Almost a half-century old, the system evolved from
assumptions current at the time Congress enacted the law: that protec-
tion stems from paid employment; that benefits reflect a family's needs
over those of a single individual; that the husband is the source of in-
come while the wife is the homemaker; and that marriages are lifelong.
These assumptions may not be as widely shared today as they were a
half century ago.88 The number of women in the labor force has risen
dramatically, and one in every three marriages ends in divorce. These
facts challenge the assumptions of the Social Security System and cre-
ate disparities.
A homemaker, as well as a wage-earning spouse who leaves the
work force for a long period of time to raise children, receives no social
security benefits in her own right for her services. She may suffer
financial hardship at the time of a subsequent divorce or her husband's
death. A homemaker, aged sixty-five, cannot receive social security un-
til her husband reaches age sixty-two and only then if he elects to re-
ceive benefits paid upon early retirement. A homemaker's family will
not receive disability or survivor's benefits, if the homemaker dies or
becomes disabled. Homemakers may also lose their own disability
coverage, if they are unable to meet a recent employment test that re-
quires them to be in the labor force five out of the previous ten years
before becoming disabled. A spouse's benefit is set at fifty percent of
the worker's benefit. This is frequently inadequate and unjust to a di-
vorced spouse.89
85. 430 U.S. 199, 216-217 (1977).
86. 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1977).
87. 439 U.S. 572, 585 (1979).
88. HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING, 96TH CONG., IST SESS., WOMEN AND RETIREMENT IN-
COME PROGRAMS: CURRENT ISSUES OF EQUITY AND ADEQUACY CHAPTER 111 SOCIAL SE-
CURITY (Comm. Print 1979).
89. Id. at 30-32.
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Past proposals addressed the homemaker's and underemployed
spouse's problems. One proposal sought to average a couple's earnings.
Benefits to each member would have been equal to the average of both
earners' salaries. In homes with one wage earner, the couple would
have been treated as if both worked in order to allocate income to each
person. This proposal would have, however, reduced aggregate bene-
fits to couples with one wage earner. 90
A second proposal would have divided a couple's earnings equally.
The couple's earnings would have been split on a year-to-year basis
only for the years of marriage. Each spouse would have received credit
for earnings, regardless of which member received monetary remunera-
tion for their work. The credit would have been the greater of fifty
percent of the couple's total earnings or seventy-five percent of the
earnings of the highest paid spouse. This plan would have allowed
homemakers and underemployed spouses to acquire Social Security
protection in their own right. In addition, women who move in and out
of the work force would have maintained a continuous employment
record.9 Other proposals suggest that Social Security provide credit
for homemaker services to those homemakers between the ages of
eighteen and sixty-five who are not employed fulltime.92
Despite flaws and budgetary restraints, these and other proposals
should be improved and studied. The failure to recognize the value of
a homemaker's services and the inadequate provisions made under the
Social Security System for homemakers of employed spouses is a great
injustice.
C Displaced Homemaker Legislation. In 1978 legislation 93 passed
Congress that would benefit displaced homemakers-those who had
made it their career to maintain a family and who later became wid-
owed or divorced. These women often lack financial security, suffer sex
and age discrimination, lack marketable skills, and fail to qualify for
Social Security, welfare, or unemployment benefits. The legislation ac-
knowledges this group's special employment problems and provides
grants to community-based and private, non-profit organizations to est-
ablish fifty multi-purpose service centers. The centers identify commu-
nity needs and offer counseling services in health, education, and
90. Id.
91. This proposal, however, would also increase the agency's administrative duties and add to
the costs of the Social Security program.
92. See note 88 supra, at 34-39. Critics complain that this departs from the nature of Social
Security as an earnings replacement program and creates an income-maintenance welfare
program. The plan would also have to rely on those persons who claim to be homemakers.
93. H.R. 10718, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 11128, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 10270,
95th Cong., Ist Sess, (1977); and S. 418, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977). The major sponsors of
these bills included former Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana, Congresswoman Burke of Cali-
fornia, and Congressman Flenzel of Minnesota. These bills merged with other proposals to
amend the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA), and the President signed
these into law in 1978. 18 U.S.C. § 665 (Supp. 11 1978).
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financial management.94 These services promote the displaced home-
maker's marketability, improve her financial status, and improve her
credit qualifications. Under the Reagan Administration, however, the
program may suffer severe budgetary cuts or even abolition. If this
occurs, the displaced homemaker would lose one of the few opportuni-
ties available to propel herself from her unmarketable and un-
creditworthy status.
D. Day Care Centers. Single, female parents and homemakers
who desire outside employment lack the necessary financial basis for
credit, unless they are able to work. In 1979 proposed day care legisla-
tion 95 sought to address this employment problem. The bill recognized
the dramatic increase in the number of single-parent households and
the lack of adequate, affordable day care. This deficiency denies a
child proper care or forces the single parent to stay at home and rely on
welfare. 9p
The unsuccessful legislation97 would have assessed child care needs,
coordinated state and federal child care programs, and provided funds
for day care through contract or grant. The bill would have given pri-
ority to services for those in financial need and children from single-
parent households. The program also would have provided funds for
informational and referral services to assist parents in finding child
care services.98 The legislation had two goals: (1) to provide child care
for the children of mothers who wished to work and (2) to improve
existing day-care services.
Prospects for a similar bill in a Republican Senate and a Reagan
Administration appear dim. The need for day care, however, remains.
Without adequate day-care facilities, the single, female parent's oppor-
tunities for equal credit decrease.
CONCLUSION
Neither economic discrimination nor credit denial result from any
one particular factor. Discrimination in employment, 99 occupational
discrimination,"o wage discrimination,"°' and restricted entry into eco-
nomic activities 0 2 are, in part, the cause of women's inferior economic
94. H.R. 10270 § 305A, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
95. Senator Cranston introduced S. 4, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), reprinted in Child Care Act of
1979.- Hearings on S 4 Before the Subcomm. on Child and Human Development, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 6-31 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S.4].
96. Id. at 6-7.
97. Senator Cranston's bill died in the Subcommittee on Child and Human Development.
98. Hearings on S. 4, supra note 95, at 9-11.
99. Discrimination in employment refers to the high number of women unemployed. See note
10 supra.
100. Occupational discrimination refers to women relegated to low-wage and female-intensive
occupations. See note 10 supra.
101. See note 10 supra.
102. Brown, Discrimination and Pay Disparities Between White Men and Women, 101 MONTHLY
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position. No single legislative enactment will solve the problem. The
problem does not exist in a vacuum; various factors interact to aggra-
vate women's credit problems. The ECOA, by itself, cannot ensure fair
credit for women; implementations of its goals, however, will provide
equal opportunity.
Additional legislation must address the component parts of sexually
based economic discrimination. The ECOA addresses women's credit
opportunity problems. Its effectiveness, however, is diminished by dis-
criminatory state property laws, necessity and family expense statutes,
and problems that concern divorced and separated women. Congress
and the Courts must be committed to strict enforcement of the statutes
and must address the problems that aggravate credit inequality. Both
the legal profession and women's groups must educate women in their
rights, assist them in enforcing these rights, and work toward correcting
problems in existing legislation. The ECOA cannot, and does not,
force the credit industry to bear the entire burden for raising women's
economic status or to grant credit to people with insufficient resources.
Rather, the ECOA attempts to provide credit to woment in accordance
with their economic position. The effort is not always successful. The
ECOA does not achieve equal credit opportunity. It lays an incomplete
framework for economic parity between men and women, parity that
translates into equal credit opportunities.
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